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PROFITS A PRENDRE AND INTERSTATE PRICE-FIXING
C. C. Wnmi s, JR."
KEMiBLE WHITE, JR.¢ ¢
"IN NO other field of public service regulation is the controlling
lbody confronted with factors so baffling as in the natural gas
industry."1 Perhaps so drastic a statement, made two decades ago,
should now be carefully noted in the light of recent geological
facts and new legal doctrines. While the nation's gas production
has on the whole more than doubled during this period, the Appa-
lachian gas field long since passed the peak of its producing ability
-though rate-making in West Virginia's gas markets continues
to drag along through regulatory machinery,2 just as if that supply
were inexhaustible. Into the picture there has eventually come the
federal Natural Gas Act of June 21, 1938, now upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in two unanimous decisions.' Yet
the really vital issue as to proper valuation of gas leaseholds, both
as regards the producer and the producing state, seems to remain
as perplexing an enigma as before. In any event, the common
law at least has so far failed to provide the solution.
Something like half of the nation's total annual consumption
of natural gas is presently transported in interstate commerce, so
the problem of rate-making becomes a most important one, especial-
ly because such an interstate gas traffic for the most part denoted
purely private business and not public utility service prior to the
1938 federal law.' It also complicates matters that almost four-
fifths of the whole national production goes for industrial pur-
poses, with ordinary domestic use playing a surprisingly minor
role in its utilization. In other words, unlike the product of most
Professor, of Law, West Virginia University.
** Member of the Student Board of Editors, West Virginia Law Quarterly.
'Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 621, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed.
1117 (1923), per Brandeis, J., dissenting.
2 The recent gas case of Columbus, Ohio, began with the city ordinance of
1924,--see Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Columbus, 17 F. (2d) 630
(1926); it ended with the ordinance of 1941,-see Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v.
City of Columbus, 42 F. Supp. 742 (1941). During this period, there was almost
continuous litigation in all courts as to proper rates to be charged.
. Illinois National Gas Co. v. Central fllinois Public Service Co., 62 S. Ct. 384,
86 L. Ed. 322 (1942); and Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
62 S. Ct. 736, 86 L. Ed. 699 (1942).
4 Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 269 U. S. 298, 44 S. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027
(1924) ; Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 S. Ct. 268, 63 L.
Ed. 577 (1919). But see Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252
U. S. 23, 40 S. Ct. 279, 64 L. Ed. 434 (1920).
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public service companies, there is some sort of existing price for
gas which is relatively independent of the customary sales to utility-
patrons; and that gas price is established by trading at arm's
length in competition with coal, coke, oil and other fuels. Ioreover,
natural gas companies furnish an irreplaceable commodity: a
state's natural resources are seriously depleted in this kind of
commerce. It is all very well to compare the interstate development
of gas reserves with the movement of timber, iron ore and other
raw materials from mining states to manufacturing centers, but
the essential factor of price control is then overlooked. Under
normal conditions, there is no restraint on the interstate bargain-
ing as to timber or solid minerals: a producing state's economy
is not seriously threatened by outside rate-making. It must be
borne in mind, of course, the litigation in Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia. merely involved the producing state's effort to afford
priority to its own domestic gas consumers, without regard to con-
siderations of cost. On the other hand, interstate rate-making may
in the long run entail the export of so valuable a natural resource
at a sale price less than the actual value of the commodity at the
point of origin. Should the Federal Power Commission thus follow
out all the implications of the Penitsylvania v. West Virginia
theory,7 there is apparently nothing in the way of a ruthless ex-
ploitation of gas leaseholds for the benefit of distant consuming
states.
It might be well to survey briefly methods of gas leasing in
West Virginia, in order that various legal incidents of the gas
leasehold may readily appear. Normally the Appalachian oil and
gas operator will first select an area for prospecting work, assuming
favorable structure and sand conditions; naturally the porosity and
permeability of the producing formation cannot be accurately pre-
r 262 U. S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117 (1923).
691 The investor and consumer interests may so collide as to warrant the
rate-making body in concluding that a return on historical cost or prudent
investment though fair to investors would be grossly unfair to the consumers."
Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 S. Ct. 736, 753, 86 L Ed.
699 (1942), per Black, J., concurring. It is of course theoretically possible
that an attempt might be made also to apply here the doctrine of the Assigned
Car Cases (United States v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.), 274 U. S. 564,
47 S. Ct. 727, 71 L. Ed. 1204 (1927), and thus to limit "the use of certain
interstate transportation facilities" unless a specified type of rate-base were
accepted by the interstate natural gas producer.
7Among these implications are the assumption that West Virginia gas
reserves have been irrevocably dedicated to interstate commerce, so that out-
side consumers may even demand a voice in their management, and the further
hypothesis that the producing state shall have no participation in their market-
ing under exclusive federal regulation.
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dicted by the geologist until drilling has made considerable data
available. And from this angle, new gas supplies must always
prove a risky speculation. Granted, however, a promising region
has been chosen for prospecting, the process of securing mineral
titles then gets under way. Taking into account the cost and un-
certainty of buying the mineral rights in fee,8 the sounder policy
of leasing them is usually adopted here, the practice being to get
together as large a block of leased acreages as practicable, before
drilling a test well in unproven territory. To ensure retaining the
benefit of favorable discovery, the operator must therefore acquire
and hold thousands of acres during the exploratory period. Other-
wise, successful drilling might simply prove territory controlled by
others, so that neighboring leases in each direction would have to
be bought up in competition with outsiders, and at prices reflecting
the operator's own hazardous accomplishment. Yet if a series of
dry holes indicates nonproductive land, those very leases will prob-
ably be surrendered, and their entire charges be written off as
total loss along with the serious drilling expense. By and large,
in the gas industry one thus meets with a constant cycle of sur-
rendering old leases and taking up new ones as the effort to locate
new reserves continuously persists.
Orderly development of a new producing field is seldom pos-
sible. For one reason, other operators soon enter the scene, and
keenest competition in leasing and drilling becomes inevitable.
Moreover, since gas cannot be stored in the same way as oil,' the
number of wells to be dilled must depend on market demand;
and that market demand necessarily fluctuates widely in alter-
nating periods of industrial prosperity and depression and in
seasonal variations of domestic use. A third factor is the "doc-
trine of development" 10 invented by the common law in an epoch
when judicial ideals of conservation of natural resources were
scarcely yet discernible,'-though the new federal regulations as to
s Ownership of fugacious minerals in fee simple is recognized West Vir-
ginia doctrine. Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 10 S. E. 436 (1894);
Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897); Preston v. Young, 57
W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236 (1905).
9 Sometimes underground storage can be worked out. See Hammonds v.
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 225 Xy. 685, 75 S. W. (2d) 204 (1934);
discussed in Comment (1935) 41 W. VA. L. Q. 431. An Ohio gas company
has also recently installed a plant to liquefy gas.
10 Cf. Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916).
- E. g., Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 AtI. 714, 22 L. R. A. 141 (1893).
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drilling acreage now help out somewhat. 12 And, finally, the variable
thickness and lenticular character of local producing sands make
local geological prophecy far less certain than in regions of the
southwest.13 Accordingly, operators with important markets cannot
safely rely on a few active fields: there must always be a back-log
of proven or probably productive acreage readily available for im-
mediate drilling as the market demand picks up or as existing
supplies are swiftly depleted. The size of this "savings-bank
account" of unoperated acreage is largely a matter of individual
prudence and foresight.
All these areas, both producing and noperated, are held
under oil and gas leases which have usually been secured for a
nominal consideration. Under their provisions, the operator pays
an annual delay rental-as a rule, a dollar an acre-as compen-
sation for postponing drilling; the so-called fixed term or ex-
ploratory period then runs for five or ten years, as the particular
lease may provide.14 If within this term a producing well is suc-
cessfully brought in, the extension clause ("as long thereafter as
oil or gas is produced") next comes into play, and the lease con-
tinues indefinitely thereafter for the life of the field. In that
event, the operator will pay the lessor a stipulated gas well rental
-ranging between two and three hundred dollars a year for each
well from which gas is marketed-or, somewhat less frequently and
in the newer fields, the lessor will receive a gas royalty equivalent
to one-eighth of the gas marketed. As the production gradually
diminishes over the years, the operator nurses the old wells along
until the rock pressure falls to the average abandonment minimum,
and ultimately the operation is given up.
These details are essential to an understanding of the legal
significance of the ordinary gas leasehold, which is simply the legal
right of the operator to enter on the lessor's premises, to explore
for gas, to "sever" the gas from the freehold by reducing it to
"2That is to say, the new federal drilling regulations limit the number of
wells, on an acreage basis. For example, in West Virginia, only one well is to
be drilled for each forty acres as regards ordinary shallow sands. For deep-
well drilling (i. e., to the Oriskany sand), it is one well for each hundred
and sixty acres.
13 Sisler and Tucker, Natural Gas in West Virginia [contained in GEOLOGY
of NATURAL GAS, published by the AuEuIOAN ASSOCIATION OP PETROLEUMa
GEOLOGISTS (1935)]. Davis, General Geologic Description of Natural Gas
Properties, ITEARINGS BEFORE PUBLIC SERVICE CO Mr~ISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Part I (1924).
14 No-term leases are also encountered, but these are relatively infrequent.
Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916), indicates how
such a lease may prove disadvantageous.
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possession, and to remove it from the premises. In other words,
the gas lessee has a common law profit a prendre, of an exclusive
nature, 5 conveyed originally for a term of years and then on dis-
covery extended for the life of the field.'" In West Virginia, for
example, the operator's interest is treated as a chattel real, 17 which
is to say, a profit for years rather than an incorporeal hereditament,
subject as such to the lien of an execution"' and taxable presumably
as Class IV personalty." Analogously, the lessor's rent-receiving
reversion in subsurface minerals has separate legal recognition,
being valued for tax purposes at several times the annual gas
rental or royalty per well, depending on the character of the pro-
ducing field.20 In other words, both the grantor and grantee of the
profit own important property interests; and those possess con-
siderable present taxable value, quite apart from the original con-
sideration for the lease and the development costs ensuing later.
Between the parties, together they own the gas. All this would
seem to be most elementary knowledge in oil and gas law, were it
not for the alarming proposal now seriously offered, that the inter-
state consumers should "reap the advantage of the discovery
value" of Appalachian gas leaseholds. Surely Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia ought not to be carried so far.
In the last analysis, the real question is the proper valuation
of the gas profit a prendre,-both as regards producing areas and
the unoperated leaseholds prudently held in reserve for reasonably
anticipated market demand. Recently the issue was (partly)
summed up in these words:
"When undeveloped acreage is proved non-productive,
its cost, the cost of drilling and delay rentals, are worthless.
If proved productive, however, it suddenly acquires great in-
trinsic value as a gas producing acreage. The inclusion of
this enhanced value on productive acreage in the rate base, with
the depletion expense computed upon such value and allowed
in operating expenses, provides for all losses in connection
15 Simonton, The Nature of the Interest of the Grantee under an Oil and
Gas Lease (1917) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 295. Of. Mountjoy's Case, (Common
Pleas), Co. Lris. 164b (1583).
16 See Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 IV. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909).
17 State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 NV. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896).
is Drainer v. Travis, 116 W. Va. 390, 180 S. E. 435 (1935); see Comment
(1935) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 75.
19 See Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, Assessor, 122 IV. Va. 483, 10
S. E. (2d) 901 (1940); Comment (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 239.
20 For example, in Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W. Va. 205, 8
S. E. (2d) 189 (1940); Comment (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 143. See the
RECORD therein at pp. 166, 210, 264, 329.
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with exploration and development and provides a fund to
obtain additional developed gas acreage to replenish the gas
supply."
The quoted material has reference to the "fair present value" doe-
trine as applied to gas properties. Yet unless the legal incidents
of the operator's profit are clearly realized, along with those of
the lessor's rent-receiving reversion, there is more than a possibility
that interstate rate-making may follow original cost principles, and
with depletion allowance based wholly thereon. The danger in the
present situation is that old-fashioned concepts of property law
may not apply: federal courts may eventually disregard the re-
spective legal interests involved, and arrive at the destination of
regarding the operator's gas rights as analgous to a fee ownership
in realty or personalty, valued for interstate consumers on some
prudent investment basis.
It may be suggested that there simply cannot be one general
law of property for all ordinary purposes, and then quite another
body of legal doctrine covering these very same phases of ownership
yet applicable only in special fields. In short, property rights must
perforce be identical in every branch of law, whether the issue
arises in adjective phases of pleading or evidence, or embraces sub-
stantative questions of contracts or torts; rate-making should ensue
along exactly similar lines. The only difficulty with such a com-
mon sense view is that the decisions are going the other way. In
the vast field of federal taxation, for example, fundamental con-
cepts of the law of future interests seem to fade out of the picture.
The vesting of contingent remainders,' 1 the special quality of the
possibility of reverter,22 the essential difference between the joint
tenancy and tenancy by the the entirety,2- the precise significance
of the exercise of special powers of appointment, '2 4 and the con-
2 1 In Comissioner v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 242 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1934) the issue was whether a remainder was contingent or vested.
Learned Hand. J., dissenting, said (p. 247): "I am quite aware that this is all
largely matter of words, but so is much of the law of property; and unless
we treat such distinctions as real, that law will melt away and leave not a
rack behind."
22 Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74, 80
L. Ed. 29, 100 A. L. R. 1239 (1935), per Stone, J., dissenting (296 U. S. 46):
"Having in mind the purpose of the statute and the breadth of its language,
it would seem to be of no consequence what particular conveyancers' device--
what particular string-the decedent selected to hold in suspense the ultimate
disposition of his property until the moment of his death."
23 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 369, 59 S. Ct. 551, 83 L. Ed. 765
(1939), per Black, J.
24 Whitney v. State Tax Comm., 309 U. S. 530, 60 S. Ct. 635, 84 L. Ed. 909
(1940), per Frankfurter, J. Cf., Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U. S. 355, 357, 60
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [1942], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol48/iss3/4
232 PROFITS A PRENDRE AND PRICE-FIXING
elusive presumption as to capacity for issue:", these and others
lose their common law force in tax cases. A recent opinion phrased
the new practice thus :26
"The constitutionality of an exercise of the taxing power
of Congress is not to be determined by such shadowy and
intricate distinctions of common law property concepts and
ancient fictions."
If one were to substitute the expression rate-making for the word
taxing in tbat broad dictum, and then to stress overmuch "the con-
sumer interest" emphasized in the Natural Gas Pipeline case, 27 it
would be an easy solution to ignore leasehold values. A misappli-
cation of Pennsylvania v. West Virginia might then seriously
jeopardize the producing state's welfare.
After all, in the Appalachian region the natural gas still repre-
sents a valuable subsurface mineral resource; and there is no ade-
quate motive for its exploitation unless the respective owners of
these various property rights are fairly compensated. Certainly
the original nominal cost of the gas-producing acreage is scarcely
the proper basis for determining its real worth, ignoring as this
does the risk and effort involved in discovery. The dry-hole hazard,
S. Ct. 277, 84 L. Ed. 319 (1939); "Taxation is mot so much concerned
with the refinements of title." See Leach, Powers of Appointment and the
Federal Rstate Tax-A Dissent (1939) 52 Harv. L. REv. 961.
2 5 United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272, 285, 54 S. Ct. 389,
78 L. Ed. 793 (1934), per Sutherland, J.: "Moreover, the case does not in-
volve the rule against perpetuities, the devolution of property, the rights or
title of living persons in or to property, or any other situation such as con-
stituted the background of practically all the decisions which have sustained
the conclusiveness of the presumption."
26 Per Black, J., in United States v. Jacobs, supra n. 23. See Comm 'r of
Internal Revenue v. Marshall, 125 F. (2d) 943, 945 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), per
Phank, J.: "It is argued, in effect, that the differentiation made in 'property
law' between 'vested' and 'contingent' remainders is a sort of sacred cow
which, in all circumstances and in particular when applying the gift tax statute,
must be respected. The argument runs that once a contingent remainder
always a contingent remainder: that if a gift is 'contingent', it is not a
'completed' gift and is, therefore, not taxable as such. . . . The Supreme
Court there remarked that 'the law of contingent and vested remainders is
full of casuistries'; said that those 'elusive and subtle casuistries' may 'have
their historic justification but possess no relevance for tax purposes'; noticed
that those 'niceties of . . .conveyancing' derive 'from medieval concepts' re-
lating to ancient forms of land ownership; and flatly announced: 'Distinctions
which originated under a feudal economy when land dominated social rela-
tions are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so large-
ly directed toward intangible wealth.' ... And that is all to the good: Un-
scrupulous and unreliable in his life, Coke should not govern us from the
grave. " 1
27 Per Black, J., concurring, in Federal Power Conn. v. Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co., supra n. 6.
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for example, seriously increases the speculative character of the
venture: 2s "fishing jobs", storms, fires and destructive accidents
also serve to enhance the value of productive territory, to an extent
hardly realized by the courts. Similarly, the "wasting asset" char-
acter of gas development has both direct and indirect effects. One
readily grasps the notion that the producing mine, or oil or gas
well will sooner or later become exhausted, without always noting
that, a gradually-declining production must inevitably send up
operation costs. When the rock pressure is high and little need be
done to the gas to get it to market, the task is comparatively simple;
but as producing areas decline, compressor stations must more
and more be added and new expenses incurred. The long and
short of it has invariably been that gas charges constantly rise,
once the supply begins to fall off. Still another aspect of the lease-
hold valuation is this unique and irreplaceable commodity which
is yielded, for there is vast superiority over manufactured gas in
B. T. U. content, flame temperature, odor and nonpoisonous
properties.' 9 As noted above, this cheap convenient fuel service
differs fundamentally from the ordinary utility product in the
view that the chattel delivered to the consumer can here never
be duplicated: a business marketing electricity or water or trans-
portation has no such dismal future ahead. So for all those rea-
sons, it is important now to analyze carefully the statutory regu-
lation recently established by the federal government-which is
in the truest sense historic.
The Natural Gas Act of 193830 is significant both as a record of
legal principles and as a model of present-day statutory com-
position. After reciting that the interstate gas business "is affected
with a public interest", the act then brings within its scope all
natural gas transportation and sale for resale in interstate com-
merce, for ultimate public consumption "for domestic, commercial
industrial or any other use." In brief, there are then the cus-
tomary rate-making provisions, forbidding unjust, unreasonable,
unduly discriminatory rates, charges, classifications, practices and
the like. The gas company must of course file all its tariffs, and
can make no changes therein except on due notice to the Federal
Power Commission and public; but the commission may promptly
28 BROWN, VALUATION o Om AD GAS LA NDs (1924) 125: one West Virginia
operator recently had three dry holes, with a total cost of more than four
hundred thousand dollars, all within a total period of eighteen months or less.
29 WYER, LOUISIANA'S NATURAL GAS SI UAT oN (1928) 13.
3o 15 U. S. C. A. §717 to §717w, (June 21, 1938, c. 556, 52 STAT. 821).
8
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investigate and suspend any such new rates filed. Naturally the
power is expressly conferred to set aside all gas prices which are
found bad, either after complaint made by consumers or upon the
commission's own investigation. The essential valuation authority
is in these words :"'
"The Commission may investigate and ascertain the actual
legitimate cost of the property of every natural-gas company,
the depreciation therein, and, when found necessary for rate-
making purposes, other facts which bear on the determination
of such cost or depreciation and the fair value of such proper-
ty.22•
And, to prevent the company from withdrawing from its presently-
imposed statutory duty of public service, the approval of that
regulatory body is prerequisite to abandonment of existing facilities
-plus an administrative finding as to the depletion of gas supplies.
Along with the usual sections dealing with accounts, records and
reports, one finds a paragraph specifically empowering the com-
mission to fix finally proper rates of depreciation and amortization
of properties used in the business. Extremely adequate procedural
provisions take care of hearings, interstate cooperation, complaints
from local jurisdictions and enforcement matters; and as a sort
of afterthought, the law generally approves of the conservation of
natural gas. It is further to be noted that, among its investigatory
functions,-
"The Commission may, after hearing, determine the ade-
quacy or inadequacy of the gas reserves held . ..; and may
also, after hearing, determine the propriety and reasonable-
ness of the inclusion in operating expenses, capital, or sur-
plus of all delay rentals or other forms ,of rental or compeln-
sation for unoperated lands and leases." 32
In short, the marketing of interstate gas is henceforth to be con-
trolled in almost every detail by the Federal Power Commission.
One reservation at least should be made. Theoretically, tho
provisions of the act do not apply "to the production or gathering
of natural gas", 33 -whatever that may mean. On the other hand,
there is ample authority in the commission to determine the cost
of production both in interstate and intrastate sales, so that the
limitation quoted will probably not amount to much. Perhaps its
purpose is merely to relieve the federal authorities from assuming
3115 U. S. 0. A. §717e (a).
32 15 U. S. C. A. §717m (b).
3315 U. S. C. A. §717 (b).
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any responsibility for drilling the wells or compressing gas prepara-
tory to transportation; as a matter of fact, few outside the indus-
try would really be competent to prophesy as to successful develop-
ment of the Oriskany sand or Corniferous lime. Moreover, an-
other interesting implication in the law has to do with sale for
resale for industrial consumption. The commission has been ex-
pressly forbidden to suspend any new filed rates relating to in-
dustrial use only, the thought presumably being that this type of
buyer can take care of himself more adequately. A final comment
here might properly be that the statute does not purport to be
retrospective,14 even though in determining "fair value" there is
to be an ascertainment of "actual legitimate cost." That is to say.
the act does expressly not attempt to convert the private enter-
prise of pre-1938 vintage retroactively into an interstate public
utility during all the decades of its previous operation. Until the
Supreme Court has ruled otherwise, it would thus appear that the
1938 company was being regulated by Congress and on its 1938
assets.
If one can properly infer from the very silence of the Natural
Gas Act that the method of valuing gas profits a prendre is still
open, the prior administrative and judicial practice in the task of
intrastate rate-making should then be studied. Actually this whole
issue is barely a quarter of a century old; yet as one wanders
through the labyrinth of case-law, finding value is as complicated
as "finding a lost dog." 3  Granted the term fs capable of reasonable
definition, 8 at least for rate-making purposes,3 7 its legal history is
rather unsatisfactory. The starting point might well be Judge
Learned Hand's generalization:38
34 See Roberts, J., dissenting, in Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U. S. 355, 60 S.
Ct. 277, 84 L. Ed. 319 (1939). Of. cases cited (308 U. S. 373, n. 1), as for-
bidding retroactivity.
3r 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 133, (quoting Prof. John
H. Gray). Earlier, (p. 27), Prof. Bonbright remarks feelingly: "But popular
thinking, like poetic thinking, is prone to identify the true with the beautiful,
and to say that what should be the value of the property, is its value." 2
36 It is said that Sydney Smith once joined the Political Economy Club,
simply in order to learn the meaning of the term value: he resigned from that
club as soon as he had discovered that the other members knew as little as he
did about it.
372 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1112: "The result may be com-
pared to that which a novice at photography obtains when he finds, to his
dismay, that he has taken several exposures without remembering to turn his
film. In the center of the developed film may be seen the face of a friend in
Kansas City, which dissolves gradually into the cornice of the Columbia Uni-
versity Library, which in turn merges into lines and shadows reminiscent of a
trip to the Pyramids of Egypt."
38 Learned Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the
10
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"The most generally accepted notion is that there is no
rigid principle at all, but that under the guise of some such
soothing phrase, as reasonable value, all difficulties of theory
shall be veiled, and embarrassing commitments avoided. Values
shall in each case be determined it seems which will not too
much outrage the susceptibilities of either side, by the comfort-
ing doctrine that all principles, however conflicting, shall have a
just recognition."
Broadly the decisions raise two questions, namely, the propriety
of placing any sort of value on leaseholds, and the precise way of
ascertaining that value (once the nature of the valuation has been
settled). Under the former question, there are three possible solu-
tions: first, to allow the cost of acquiring and holding leases as
an operating expense; next, to allow the capitalization of the actual
cost of acquiring the leaseholds, charging carrying costs to operating
expenses; and finally, to capitalize the leases at their present-day
or appreciated value, charging holding costs to operating expenses.
To sum up, the rate-making authority has to determine once and
for all whether leases are to be capitalized; should such capitaliza-
tion be sanctioned, it must choose the sort of value to be utilized;
but ultimately, having disposed of these other two thorny problems,
the last and most tricky puzzle may actually turn out to be the
exact means of proof by which a fair ascertainment of such legal
value can be had. 9
It would be convenient to separate the case-law into two
periods, marking the division by the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Kyj., 40 a dozen
years ago. Originally, in the earlier stage, there was considerable
uncertainty among commissions and courts as to how to tackle the
issue. Here, for example, In re Clarksburg Light & Heat Co.,4'
held in 1916 that leaseholds .hn-uld be capitalized at their fair
present value, the Public Service Commission allowing a substantial
amount both for producing and unoperated territory. Shortly
thereafter, In re West Virginia Central Gas Co.,42 analogously set
Teaching of Law? (1926) 24 Mi ie. L. REv. 466, 473. See Gloyd v. Commn'r of
Internal Revenue, 63 F. (2d) 649, 653 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933): " Value is a very
indefinite thing and difficult, if not impossible, of actual and specific determina-
tion."2 See Beutel, Valiuation as a Requirement of Due Process of Law in
Rate Cases (1930) 43 HARtv. L. Rz'v. 1249.
39 The writer has here followed the analysis of E. M. Borger in an un-
published ms., The Valuation of Natural Gas Leaseholds (1924).
40 278 U. S. 300, 49 S. Ct. 150, 73 L. Ed. 390 (1929).
41 1 W. VA. PUBLIC SERVICE Comm. DECIsIONs 191 (1916).
42 1 W. VA. PUBLIC SERVICE Co . DEciSIONs 455, 463 (1918).
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the valuation for that utility's leaseholds at fifty dollars an acre.
These two decisions were later disapproved by the commission, by
In re United Fitel Gas Co.,4" where more than half a million acres
were involved the greater part of which was undeveloped: accord-
ingly only total investment cost was allowed. That new precedent
was then employed for In re Hope Natural Gas Co.,44 to the same
effect. The whole subject soon came before the Supreme Court of
Appeals in City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm.,45 its syllabus
favoring "present fair value:"
"Consequently it is entitled to have included in its present
fair value as a rate base for rate making purposes, appreciation
in the value of its gas leaseholds over investment cost."
Natural Gas Co. of W. Va. v. Public Service Comml.,46 almost imme-
diately limited the Charleston case by deciding that if the total of
delay rentals paid equalled or exceeded "the appreciation in value
of the leaseholds over investment cost, such appreciated value should
not be included as a part of the rate base." In re Cumberland &
Allegheny Gas Co.47 merely purported to follow these judicial hold-
ings, as did the second Clarksbllrg48 litigation.
Pennsylvania rate-making quickly developed along similar
lines. In City of Erie v. Pennsylvania Gas Co.,4" (where most of
the gas lands were held in fee), the Public Service Commission in-
dicated that leaseholds should be given their present fair value;
but refused to accept as convincing the valuation proof adduced
since that was based on probable future production and gas sales
at predicted market prices. On appeal,55 the superior court was
equally divided, three judges believing the commission's finding
as to present value was final, while the other three were of opinion
that gas holdings should be valued only at original cost. Interest-
ingly enough, these latter regarded gas estates as stored product.
The issue then went to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court," where
the rule as to present value was squarely adopted in these terms:
"Some of the confusion in regard to this evidence might
be attributable to the company's submitting three theories of
43 Id. at 501, 511, 515 (1918).
44 1 W. VA. PUBLIC SERVICE Co2nfm. DECISIONS 839, 845-6 (1921).
45 95 W. Va. 91, 120 S. E. 398 (1923), syl. 2.
48 95 W. Va. 557, 121 S. E. 716 (1924), syl. 6.
47 2 W. VA. PUBLIC SEIVIc C OMM. DECISIONS 514 (1927).
48 d. at 611 (1927).
49 9 P. 0. R. 527 (Pa. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1921).
co 81 Pa. Super. 65, 11 P. 0. R. 443 (1923).
5' 278 Pa. 512, 528, 123 AtI. 471, P. U. R. 1924D 89 (1924).
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valuation-the present value, commodity value, and segrega-
tion value .... Keeping in mind the purpose for which this
evidence was offered, the value of any mineral land must
necessarily depend primarily upon demand, quantity, cost of
production, and the price received for the marketed product.
... The value of the land is not the selling price of a cubic
foot of gas as applied to the supposed quantity in a given
field; its value is fixed as a whole, or at so much an acre."
In Ohio, the course of valuation was more tortuous. The Public
Utilities Commission originally examined the matter in the cases of
In re Northeastern Oil & Gas Co., 5 2 and In re Aslhtabula Gas Co.,-'
coming to the conclusion that the cost of acquiring and holding
leases should be included as an operating expense. The reason
given was the extreme difficulty of finding any fair basis "on which
to calculate the value of gas leases, and especially those covering
undeveloped territory." The commission then swung over to a
book-cost basis. A decade later, in the first Logan Gas (JompazV "
case, such a value was placed on the "used and useful" class 1
acreage (operated); but the Ohio Supreme Court" reversed this,
holding that the "actual cost" could not be the proper method.
Upon remand, the commission appraised the operated territory at
twenty-five dollars an acre5 6 The Supreme Court now affirmed,' 7
observing that the commission had
"... arrived at the conclusion that the actual market value
was slightly in excess of the value placed upon the leases in
the transactions by the original companies, and by this com-
pany itself where it had acted both as a willing seller and
willing buyer and had both sold and bought such leases."
At first the New York Public, Service Commission, by In re
Iroquois Natural Gas Co.,8 followed the early Ohio rulings and re-
fused to sanction the increase of the capital account by adding the
appreciated value of the leases upon development or operation.
Later, on review, the Appellate Division"9 held that while there
might be difficulties in the way of determining "present valua-
tions", these obstacles did not excuse the necessity for such deter-
52 p. U. R. 1916D 692 (1916).
53P. U. R. 1917D 790, 80 (1917).
54 F. U. R. 1929A 232; P. U. R. 1929B 480 (1929).
,5121 Ohio St. 507, 509, 169 N. E. 575 (1929).
re P. U. R. 1930D 451 (1930).
57124 Ohio St. 248, 177 N. E. 587 (1931).
-8 P. U. .. 1919D 76 (1919).
-9 194 App. Div. 578, 186 N. Y. Supp. 177, P. U. R. 1921B 485 (1921).
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mination. So in People v. Public Service Comm., ° the commission
duly accepted the present fair value of the utility's gas properties
as required by the Iroquois reversal, but promptly deducted certain
depreciation set up on the company's books; the reviewing court
then cancelled that deduction as being wholly unwarranted. The
final decision of Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm.,' 1
unqualifiedly accepted market value of leaseholds as the measure of
present value, completely disregarding criticism by the commis-
sion concerning the reliability of rock pressure measurements to
ascertain present gas content.
The legal history of leasehold valuation within the Appala-
chian territory was mirrored in case-law from the mid-continent
field. All the old rulings,-for and against capitalization or for
and against present value,-were reviewed in decisions by Okla-
homa, 2 Kansas8 3 and Montana 4 commissions and courts. The up-
shot of it all was the approval of an administrative process of
valuing gas rights on some basis of present worth, so that the na-
tional picture was uniform: up to a dozen years ago, there was
very little doubt as to the proper solution. To be sure, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held82 that the total of the
delay rentals paid had to be taken into account for any survey of
appreciation in lease values; yet that judicial result can be under-
stood, even though it s~ems doubtful. Possibly there was the
intuitive thought of achieving lower rates in the regulated West
Virginia market for the West Virginia consumers of an exhaustible
West Virginia natural resource, as against higher prices in the un-
regulated sales outside the state. This would seem to be an ex-
tremely broad extension of the custom of the lessor's free gas
covenant, so as to amount to a "cheap gas covenant" in favor of
local consumers; yet in substance that is what the delay rental
holding might accomplish. By keeping down the rate base through
a discount of leasehold appreciation, it is not far-fetched to sug-
gest the West Virginia theory effectively protected domestic con-
sumers. Perhaps it merely illustrated a latent effort to circumvent
Go 198 N. Y. Supp. 193, P. U. R. 19230 239 (1923).
- 207 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1925).
32 Be Pawhuska. Oil & Gas Co., P. U. R. 1917D 947 (1917); American In-
dian Oil & Gas Co. v. Poteau, 108 Okla. 215, 235 Pac. 900 (1925).
83Landon v. Lawrence, P. U. R. 1916B 331 (1916); Landon v. Public
Utilities Comm., 242 Fed. 658, P. U. R. 1918A 31 (D. C. Kan. 1917).
64Rle Baker Natural Gas Utility, P. U. R. 1921E 609, 622 (1921); Public
Service Comm. v. Montana Petroleum Co., P. U. R. 1924B 364.
6r Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 95 W. Va. 557, 121 S. E. 716
(1924), syl. 6.
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Pennsylvania v. West Virginia: granted West Virginia consumers
could not have priority as a matter of state legislation, they might
at least have more favorable prices for the local product as a mat-
ter of judicial decision.
Such was the background of state administrative practice
when in 1929 the issue finally reached the United States Supreme
Court. The doctrine had already there been settled that the utility
patron had no absolute claim to a share in the company's assets.
"Customers pay for service not for the property used lo
render it. Their payments are not contributions to depreciation
or other operating expenses or to capital of the company. By
paying bills for service they do not acquire any interest, legal
or equitable, in the property used for their convenience or in
the funds of the company. Property paid for out of moneys
received for service belongs to the company just as does that
purchased out of proceeds of its bonds and stock.' ' 7
The situation of the gas consumer was regarded as more or less
analogous to that of the patron who regularly paid the fares
charged by the street railway company. 8 foreover, the zenith of
the reproduction value theory had already been reached in the
Indianapolis Water Company case, 6 and some reaction from this
point was probably tobe anticipated.
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of ICy.,10 involved
valuation of gas rights covering a total of more than eight hundred
thousand acres, a relatively small part of which was held in fee.
Geological and engineering experts had computed an estimate of
the total volume of gas underlying the proven and probable terri-
tory. These calculations had been supplemented by testimony that
in Pittsburgh there was an unregulated market for industrial gas,
which could always be maintained in competition with coal and coal
86 262 U. S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117 (1923).
67 Board of Comm'rs v. M. Y. Telephone Co., 271 U. S. 23, 32, 46 Ct. 363, 70
L. Ed. 808 (1926).
68 During the oral argument of the United Fuel Gas Co. appeal, the follow-
ing discussion occurred:
"Mr. Justice McReynolds: What do you mean by the public invest-
ing in these lands?
"Counsel for Protestants: I mean, carrying the cost of the delay
rentals until gas has been produced....
"Mr. Justice Van Devanter: That does not mean any more than it
would if you said that the public had paid the expenses of the street car
company here in the District of Columbia, does iti"
69 McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144, 71 L.
Ed. 316 (1926).
70278 -U. S. 300, 49 S. Ct. 150, 73 L. Ed. 390,(1929), approved in Comment
(1929) 35 W. VA. L. Q. 364.
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products. Other experts familiar with the production and market-
ing side had given opinions also based on an assumed gas supply
available for unregulated sale at predictable prices. On the other
hand, only about a sixth of the entire acreage was proven territory.
After characterizing the proof offered as "wanting in probative
force", the Court held:
"On the record as made, appellants have failed, to present
any convincing evidence of value of their gas field which would
enable us to assign to it any greater value than that which
they appear to have assigned to it on their books. This book
value, therefore, may be accepted, not as evidence of the real
value of the gas field, but as an assumed value named by the
appellants, which on the evidence presented cannot reasonably
be fixed at any higher figure."71
Accordingly, since the burden of proving the value in a con-
fiscation case rested on the utility, and had to be "supported by
clear and convincing evidence", the action of the lower federal
court in denying an injunction against the commission rate-making
was unanimously affirmed. It must be borne in mind, however,
that the company had roughly but seventy thousand operated
acres,-with more than ten times that much unoperated,-and it
was allowed by the Court to include the latter in its rate base and
their delay rentals in operating expenses. This decision was thus
conclusively significant for several reasons. In the first place, the
issue as to capitalization was definitely settled, in the affirmative;
the value of leaseholds had to be taken into account, in natural gas
regulation. Next, precise evidence was essential in the establish-
ment of the valuation claimed, for the testimony as to a computed
value for gas reserves in the ground based on geological estimates
and predicted future prices could not be accepted. Nevertheless,
the inference was left that had market value been proven, by ade-
quate sales and purchases of leases, its adoption would have been
approved. Finally, reasonable accumulations of undeveloped acre-
age might be sustained, where the operator's business required such
prudence and foresight.
With the United Fuel Gas case, a new chapter began in lease-
hold valuation. Litigation was henceforth to turn on the adequacy
of the proof offered by the operator in support of its position as
to present fair value. To be sure, in Los Angeles Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Railroad Comm. of Cal.,7 2 the Chief Justice observed as to
71 278 V. S. 300, 318.
72 289 U. S. 287, 305, 53 S. Ct. 637,.77 L. Ed. 1180 (1933).
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public utility properties that "the criteria at hand for ascertaining
market value, or what is called exchange value, are not commonly
available." Still in subsequent rate cases, efforts were diligently
made to produce the "clear and convincing evidence" required.
Dayton, Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,73 brought the
problem to the Supreme Court once more. In addition to the cus-
tomary forecasts of production capacity in an unregulated market,
there were now instances of actual sales of other leaseholds in
sporadic transactions, at disparate prices. The Ohio Commission
had valued producing acreage at twenty-five dollars an acre, follow-
ing the precedent of the Logan case74 and disregarding book cost.
It was held without dissent that the burden of proof as to con-
fiscation on the basis of the old rates had not been sustained. A few
weeks later, Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Cornn.7 5
saw the reversal of new rates which had been established without
taking into consideration amortization allowance. The Ohio Com-
mission had properly provided such a depletion fund, but this item
was stricken out on review by the Ohio Supreme Court." The
opinion of Justice Cardozo was emphatic in holding such rate-
making confiscatory:
"To withhold from a public utility the privilege of in-
cluding a depletion allowance among its operating expenses,
while confining it to a return of 61/ upon the value of its
wasting assets, is to -take its property away from it without due
process of law, at least where the waste is inevitable and rapid.
... Plainly the state must either surrender the power to limit
the return or else concede to the business a compensating
privilege to preserve its capital intact."
As to delay rentals upon leases in reserve, that same jurist ruled
in both the Dayton and Columbus cases an adequate amortization
allowance must suffice. Moreover, unoperated leaseholds should not
in fairness be capitalized "until present or imminent need for use
as sources of supply" had "brought them into the base upon which
profits must be earned." Incidentally, the last in the series of this
appeals, West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.7 7 contained
an important dictum as to the alleged monopolistic character of
natural gas.
73292 U. S. 290, 54"S. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267 (1934).
74 121 Ohio State 507, 509, 169 N. E. 575 (1929).
75 292 U. S. 398, 404-405, 54 S. Ct. 763, 78 L. Ed. 1327 (1934).
76 127 Ohio St. 109, 187 N. E. 7 (1933).
77 294 U. S. 63, 72, 55 S. Ct. 316, 79 L. Ed. 761 (1935).
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"The suggestion is made that there is no evidence of
competition. We take judicial notice of the fact that gas is
in competition with other forms of fuel, such as oil or elec-
tricity. "
The direct issue of leasehold valuation has not again reached
the Supreme Court, although the recent decision in the Natural
Gas Pipeline case7s is indicative of the Court's interest in the sub-
ject. Chief Justice Stone, who wrote the opinion in United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Railroad Conn.,79 again spoke for the majority; and
specifically observed that the Federal Power Commission had here
taken the operator's statement as to the present value of the gas
reserves. On the whole, the comment is rather neutral as to the
commission's action:
"And the allowed 'present value' of leases as of June 1,
1939, $13,334,775, is approximately $4,000,000 more than book
cost, even without taking into account a substantial reduction
for depletion reserves of $1,152,854, which the companies had
accrued on their own books by the end of 1938.'"
Nothing was said about undeveloped acreage, nor was there any
court reference to the inclusion of delay rentals in some rate-making
category. As to amortization allowance, however, it was ruled that
the prior book charges for depreciation, depletion and retirements,
set up on the company books during the unregulated period prior
to the Natural Gas Act of 1938, were properly to be considered
by the commission in calculating the 1938 rate base. In other words.
present value of leaseholds in 1938 had to be reckoned in the light
of past depletion accounts, so that amortization charges over the
life of the gas fields could be spread over all past and future years
of production. Operating expenses absorbing post-1938 amortizing
would thus be materially reduced.
One may therefore sum up the Supreme Court holdings as
being inconclusive on the issue. To be sure, leasehold values must
be capitalized; but the quantum of proof and the type of expert
witness required seem difficult of attainment,-when anything
other than book cost is sought. Suppose, as in the Ohio cases and
78 62 S. Ct. 736, 86 L. Ed. 699 (1942).
79 278 U. S. 300, 49 S. Ct. 150, 73 L. Ed. 390 (1929). It is interesting to
note that Chief Justice Stone wrote the first (United Fuel Gas) and the last
(Natural Gas Pipeline) of these valuation decisions. In between, Justice
Cardozo wrote the opinions in the Dayton, Columbus and West Ohio cases.
so 62 S. Ct. 736, 744, 86 L. Ed. 699 (1942). In this connection, it is important
to compare the result under the Uniform System of Accounts for Gas Utilities,
adopted (1939) by the Public Service Commission of West Virginia.
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the new Natural Gas Pipeline decision, some sort of present value is
in fact adopted by the administrative body: that is not reversible
error. Nor does the administrative ruling violate the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments by excluding present value altogether,
provided there is not clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
ALnd the latest word as to unoperated leases is Cardozo's language
in the Columbus case:
"Leases bought with income, the proceeds of the sale of
gas, and thus paid for in last analysis through the contributions
of consumers, ought not in fairness to be capitalized until
present or imminent need for use as sources of supply shall
have brought them into the base upon which profits must be
earned. To capitalize them sooner is to build the rate struc-
ture of the business upon assets held in idleness to abide the
uses of the future.""'
It must also be remembered that delay rentals, according to the
Cardozo opinions, are not to be charged to operating expenses in
instances where the amortization allowance makes adequate pro.
vision for acquiring new leases out of current earnings.
During this second period of case-law, following the United
Fuel Gas decision, local intrastate decisions likewise became some-
what more doubtful as to claims for present value. A lower federal
court, for example, followed this attitude of non ins deficit sed
probatio82 in Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Kan.,, 3
by refusing to give weight to evidence of market value of lease-
holds. Yet that court did allow cost of both operated and un-
developed leases, amounting to about half the utility's contention;
and, what is even more strildng, delay rentals on all unoperated
acreage were there included in operating expenses, despite the
fact that only three and a half per cent of the company's 1,200,000
acres were indeed operated. In West Virginia, Judge Hatcher3
4
analyzed further the type of evidence necessary to sustain the mar-
ket value of leaseholds, stressing the effect of paying delay rentals
out of operating expenses (as in the Natural Gas case ) and em-
. phasizing the right of eminent domain conferred on operators by
the West Virginia public. As to the latter, he suggested "that high
privilege must now be considered in favor of the public." Presum-
81 292 U. S. 398, 407, 54: S. Ct. 763, 78 L. Ed. 1327 (1934).
32 It is the proof, not the substantive law, which is lacldng.
83p . R. 1933B 225; 2 F. Supp. 792 (D. C. Kan. 1933).
S4 City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm., 110 W. Va. 245, 255-6, 159
S. E. 38 (1931).
sr 95 NV. Va. 557, 121 S. E. 716 (1924).
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ably, however, the "public" would include merely citizens of the
producing state and not consumers outside. A few years later,
Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co.8 6 held that the evidence of the experts
as to market valuation for the leases was "not of that convincing
character" required by the decisions:
"In these days of over production in the gas fields, such
evidence, at most highly speculative, should be of the strongest
possible character; otherwise the safeguards set up by the
courts would become meaningless."
Furthermore, in the light of the Columbiis case,? there had been
error, according to the Supreme Court of Appeals, by including
all the undeveloped acreage in the rate base. As to delay rentals
already paid on surrendered leases and expenditures for dry holes
in the past, however, it was squarely held that such items were
"comparable to charges for maintenance and replacement of phys-
ical properties, and therefore not deductible from the appreciable
value of the current leaseholds, where such a value is established."
The Ohio court re-examined the problem in Columbuis Gas
& Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,88 where the commission had
rejected the company's evidence as to market value but had fixed
the value substantially in excess of the utility's book value, as in
prior cases. This result, it was now decided, was erroneous, for
only the present book value of class 1 leaseholds should have been
included,-with all delay rentals analogously excluded. As noted
above, the case was reversed by the United States Supreme Court,8 '
because amortization charges had not been allowed. The most im-
portant Ohio decision in recent years has been East Ohio Gas Co.
v. Public Utilities Comm.,9o in which developed territory was valued
at seventy dollars an acre; and the Ohio court unanimously af-
firmed such a valuation. This leasehold value included not only cost
of acquisition and delay rentals on later-productive leaseholds: but
also took into account that cost and those delay rentals as to Un-
operated leases cancelled in the process of exploration,-in the
average amount of fifty-two unoperated acres cancelled to one acre
found to be productive. In short, the total expense for unproductive
abandoned leaseholds, as above, had to be charged back as a loss
and represented "a wasted or wasting asset" within the rate base.
so 115 W. Va. 149, 164-165, 175 S. E. 339 (1934).
87 292 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267 (1934).
ss 127 Ohio St. 109, 187 N. E. 7 (1933).
89 292 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267 (1934).
90 137 Ohio St. 225, 28 N. E. (2d) 599, 35 P. U. R. (N. s.) 158 (1940).
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [1942], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol48/iss3/4
246 PROFITS A PRENDRE AND PRICE-FIXING
Meantime, delay rentals on unoperated but retained leases were not
to be capitalized until operated, in line with the Cardozo dictum;
but such rentals would be accounted as operating expense.
Sifting down all this case-law for both the periods before and
after 1929, certain propositions seem clearly established. In the
first place, no court of last resort has refused to capitalize gas
leaseholds, although the precise method of capitalization still re-
iaains open. Secondly, it has not been held as a matter of federal
constitutional law that leases must be valued merely at book cost.
Thirdly, unoperated territory ought not to be capitalized until
there is "present or imminent need" for its use. Fourthly, unusual
proof by "clear and convincing evidence" is requisite to support
the claim of market valuation. And, finally, delay rentals on rea-
sonable quantities of unoperated leaseholds can be included within
operating expenses, (unless the amortization charge be adequate to
carry them). It is to be noted that the reversionary interest of the
grantor of the gas profit a prendre, as well as the economy of the
producing state, has scarcely received judicial recognition, and
there is in no sense a complete picture perfectly proportioned to the
legal eye.
One might suggest a resort to the modern economists on so
important an issue of value; yet even with the occasional art many
possess "of communicating their meaning circuitously through a
long succession of associated ideas", it is doubtful if much help can
be gotten here. With them the doctrine of prudent investment is
a kind of proof charge; any legal result that stands that test will
stand any test. Matters such as mining development or Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, or perhaps even the effect of the gold
clause decision9' on utility financing, can doubtless be regarded as
well beyond their ordinary ken. The unification of the social sci-
ences has not yet progressed to the stage where valuation of a
speculative wasting asset can be measured with certainty for rate-
making purposes, with a nice balance between the conflicting claims
of operator, reversioner, producing state and outside consumer. Yet
what is the prudent investment of each one of these? No answer
can be expected, until the economist is trained in the law or the
jurist in economics. 2 It might be well here to quote a leading
authority in the economics field :3
9' Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407, 79 L. Ed. 885,
95 A. L. R. 1352 (1935).
92 Perhaps Justice Brandeis came closest to this latter achievement.
93 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OP PROPERTY (1937) 1155. Justice Black quoted
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"It is by no means clear, however, that any rule of uni-
formity, to be imposed on all legislatures and applied to all
types of utilities, is required by the spirit of the Constitution.
The concern of the federal courts should be simply to prevent
grossly unfair treatment of investors.... Problems of fairness
to investors arise only because of the ex post facto feature in
American rate regulation. . . But it is the function of the
courts simply to see that this shift from an indefinite and
impractical standard be made without doing violence to the
reasonable expectations of present investors."
The foregoing is peculiarly apposite as to gas leaseholds, both by
reason of their unique legal incidents and because the Natural Gas
Act has now been enacted in order to regulate, as between the
states, property rights that were originally wholly-unregulated in-
vestments in wasting assets.
Apart from real property law and administrative practice,
the valuation of leaseholds is vitally concerned with geology as
well, and the wealth of geological and engineering material on the
question is significant. 94 For example, sound operating practice
requires careful attention to the "average yield of gas per acre
or per acre-foot per pound-drop in formation pressure,-to the
average thickness and porosity of various gas-bearing sandstones,-
to the average drilling and operating costs per well per year,-to the
field prices for gas,-and to the annual consumption of gas per
domestic user in different localities." 95 As to the speculative element,
the small operator who drills a few wells usually carries a higher
percentage of capital risk than the large operator who drills many
wells and whose ratio of dry holes is normally lower. Hence be-
cause of the concentrated risks, the profit or loss of the former or-
dinarily represents a much greater proportion of the total invest-
ment: for him the discovery value may legitimately be higher on
account of the excessive risk9 Moreover, the geologist or engineer
looks into the cost factors such as development expenditure, the total
quantity of gas that can possibly be extracted,9 7 the overhead in
such extraction, the various taxes (and especially those on sever-
from the preceding page in the course of his concurring opinion in the Na-
tural Gas Pipeline case.
94 See the various footnote references in Stephenson, Valuation of Xatural
Gas Properties, [contained in GEOLOGY OF NATURAL GAs, published by the
American Association of Petroleum Geologists (1935)]. As illustrative of a
recent article, see Terry, The Valuation of Oil and Natural Gas Properties as
Distinguished from Mines (1940) 21 M.ING AND METALLURGY 227.
95 Stephenson, supra n. 94, at p. 1013.
96 Stephenson, supra n. 94, at p. 1014.
97 Parsons, Accurate Estimates of Gas Reserves, OIL AND GAS JoURNAti
(May 10; 1928) 86; Davis, supra n. 13.
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ance), the rental or royalty, the well-mouth price and the probable
rate of production. Ideally, perhaps, the high rate of production
involves lower operating costs; but the greater hazards as to daily
supply of gas, inability to meet peak-load conditions and danger
to individual wells through subsurface change contributes to higher
gas costs. In addition to these considerations, there is the peril of
drainage: in any field gas migrates from areas of high to those of
low pressures, and this migration occurs regardless of property
lines.5 s And the problem of reservoir control comprises case-his-
tories of the various wells, casing procedures and cementing pro-
grams, methods of operation, the distance the sands have been
penetrated, composition of the gases in different horizons and
similar features. The geologist must also be familiar with the
arbitrary courtroom grading of leaseholds into classes 1, 2, 3 and
4V9 Ways of computing depletion, (particularly those based on the
decline in average rock pressure), 1°° have been worked out in
considerable detail; each field should be depleted as a separate unit,
and note made as to each reservoir where there is more than one
producing horizon. Finally, the operator's market must be divided
between domestic and industrial consumers, paying heed to com-
peting fuels and recalling that price generally plays a far more im-
portant part than fuel efficiency.101 Reconciliation of all such
geological and engineering phases of valuation with the theoretical
concept of prudent investment is no easy task.
Particularly is the statement true in West Virginia 02 where
98 The problem of drainage has been recognized over and over again by our
courts. See, for example, Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W. Va. 650, 187
S. E. 331 (1936).
99 Roughly, Class 1 includes acreage actually operated or so close thereto
that existence of gas has been demonstrated; Class 2 includes acreage con-
tiguous to Class 1, with geologic and engineering data indicating that the pro-
ductive area will so be extended; Class 3 is territory with at least an evoui
chance of production, according to general geologic conditions; and Class 4
comprises regions within a general gas-producing territory, that have not yet
been condemned by dry holes, with sufficient chance of production to justify
delay rentals.
lOoRawlins and Schellhardt, Baclc-Pressre Data on Natural-Gas Wells and
Their Application to Production Practices, U. S. BUREAU OF MINES MONOGRAPH
No. 7 (1935); Cutler, Estimation of Underground Oil Reserves by Oil-Well
Production Curves, U. S. BUREAU Op INES BunLEr No, 228 (1924); Beal,
The Decline and Ultimate Production of Oil Wells, with Notes on the Valuation
of Oil Properties, U. S. BUREAU Or' MINES BuL' Ia.w No. 177 (1919); Johnson
and Berwald, Deviation of Natural Gas from Boyle's Law, U. S. BUREAU OF
MINES TECHINICAL PAPER 539 (1932); Katz, A Method of Estimating Oil and
Gas Reserves (1936) 118 TRANs. A. I. M. E. 18.
101 This is perhaps the salient factor in industrial use.
102 Davis, supra n. 13; Sisler and Tucker, supra n. 13.
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producing sands are continuously variable in thickness and in-
clined to be lenticular in character, with porosity differences causing
irregular areas of production. There is a widespread distribution
over gently-sloping geological structures, without the concentrated
pools on structural highs one finds in western fields. Erratic sand
conditions naturally increase drilling hazards, though the existence
of several producing horizons somwhat balances the chances. And
West Virginia leaseholds generally produce lower open-flow
volumes; thus the delivery over longer periods of time sends up
the overhead charges. The important geological factor in all this
is that these gas pools are so limited in extent and separated by such
unproductive areas,-oceurring as they do (along anticlinal struc-
tures) on synclines, on the flanks of anticlines and on the crests.',
It is that very unpredictable quality which, more than anything
else, creates so high a discovery value for producing leaseholds.
Furthermore, existing wells must always be adequate to serve any
outside market, the demands varying in extreme fashion between
prosperity and depression periods and between winter and summer
consumption. Unusual peak demands inevitably entail increased
drilling activity, with seriously-large expenditures for exploration
and development to replenish the abnormal depletion. For ex-
ample, every large-scale operator must do a certain amount of
"wild-catting". Gas properties then materially appreciate even
more in value; and the appreciating process continues on indefinite-
ly as the Appalachian fields decline in production." 4 The average
layman who has read during the past decade or two of the enormous
amounts of gas wasted in the southwest'05 forms the impression that
the nation's gas reserves are inexhaustible or nearly so, and hardly
realizes how rapidly the eastern supply is running out. It seems
incredible to him that the fate of the Indiana gas belt' 0 can ever
prove to be the future in store for West Virginia.
For all these reasons geology as well as substantive administra-
tive law must play a part in leasehold values. The question next
arises as to how low such valuation can be constitutionally fixed,
simply in order to enable interstate consumers to enjoy cheap gas
:10 Sisler and Tucker, mtpra n. 13, p. 993.
104 Stephenson, supra n. 94, 1015-1016. See Price and Headlee, Geochemistry
of Natural Gas in Appalachian. Province (1924) 26 BuLLEI OF THE A2=-
oA Asso OAToN OP PTROLEUm[ GEOLOGISTS 19.
'o- Williams, Conservation of Mineral easources (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q.
247.
lo0 See, generally, NATIONAL RESOURCES BOARD, REPORT ON NATIONAL
PLANNING 391-439 (1934).
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prices. Of course, it would merely be arguing in a circle to assert
the operator's profit a prendre is worth no more than the capitaliza-
tion of net income from whatever gas rates may ultimately be
established by the Federal Power Commission. The whole difficulty
is, what are the proper rates; and the Natural Gas Act specifically
requires the Commission to determine "fair value" in making up
the rate base. One must accordingly start with the valuing of gas
properties, before even considering the important subsidiary issues
of operating expenses and rate of return. It is suggested, however,
in the course of Justice Black's concurring opinion'O" in the Natural
Gas Pipeline case that rate-making is essentially a sort of legisla-
tive price-fixing, with the consumer interest of paramount sig-
nificance. If that be so, then the nature or extent of the rate base
may not in the long run matter a great deal so long as distant
interstate customers get their gas for industry or home at the price
they are willing to pay. But there is as yet no indication that the
majority of the Supreme Court will eventually go that far, at least
in an instance where the producing state's wasting assets would be
exported at a grossly-unfair utility valuation.
The immediate occasion for this present enquiry into the
valuing of gas leases is a recent advocacy of the book cost theory
by counsel for the Federal Power Commission. In discussion of
depletion charges, that theory was urged as the best method of pro-
tecting outside consumers:
"When gas producing acreage is priced at original cost,
there is no enhancement of the depletion expense allowance
to cover the costs of exploration and development. The rate
payers, therefore, reap the advantage of the discovery value.
• . . [Counsel] has recommended that the original cost of
producing leases be included in the rate base, in contra-
distinction from the 'market value' of producing leases."
In other words, if the operated territory proves productive, the
operator is then allowed in his rate base merely the nominal cost
of original acquisition of those acres under which the gas was later
found by testing, along with the actual expense of drilling the wells.
There is no digcovery value for either lessor or lessee: apparently
the gas at once belongs to the interstate customer, subject only to
the payment of transportation charges and a reasonable return on
the diminutive rate-base of nominal costs and drilling expense.
No doubt it might be seriously contended that the operator is
107 62 S. Ct. 736, 749, 753, 86 L. ED. 699 (1942).
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amply safeguarded against financial loss by including within the
category of operating expenses (1) delay rentals on undeveloped
leaseholds, (2) dry-hole losses, (3) disbursements for nonpro-
ductive acreage that is abandoned and (4) the other exploration
costs. Thus, one can say, the utility has obtained a fair return on
the prudent investment basis. As regards the gas properties them-
selves, the same argument would assume that the consumers have in
the past bought a substantial equity in these particular holdings,
simply by paying prices that included delay rentals and drilling
costs. The fundamental fallacy in it all is the complete failure to
consider the reversionary interest of the lessor or the economy of
the producing state, not to mention the arbitrary and retroactive
policy of viewing the profit a prendre on the basis of an investment
of decades before, rather than according to its fair value in 1938.
Pennsylvania v. West Virginiai0 8 held that a natural gas pro-
ducing state could not by legislation require preference in its use
to be accorded local consumers, and thereby withdraw a large
volume of export gas from an established interstate current. Still
the decision did not in any way involve interstate price-fixing, nor
did it go so far as to foreshadow an attempt to jeopardize that
state's economy by harsh undervaluation of operated leaseholds.
Now under the Natural Gas Act no interstate producer can aban-
don either facilities or service 00 without the Commission's approval,
so the Pennsylvania v. West Virginia doctrine has become statutory
law. The operator cannot in the future withdraw from that traffic,
no matter how strictly interstate rate-making may be developed,"'
provided only gas reserves hold out. In such a fashion producing
leaseholds have become affected with a public interest; and lessors
and operators have devoted their gas rights to an interstate public
use. In the past it was possible for operators to contract out of the
108 The legal theory of the litigation is discussed in Hardman, The Right
of a State to Restrain the Exportation. of its. atural Resources (1919) 26 W.
VA. L. Q. 1; and Hardman, The Right of a State to Restrain the Exportation
of Natural Resources-Another View (1920) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 224.
100 15 U. S. 0. A. 717f (b).
110In the Columbus case, Justice Cardozo said (292 U. S. 398, 407): "If
the company is not satisfied to have the depletion allowance thus applied in
renewal of its life, it may divide the fund up among the stockholders and wind
the business up." The Natural Gas Act has modified this dictum. But see
Railroad Comm. v. Eastern Texas R. R., 264 U. S. 79, 44 S. Ct. 247, 68 L. Ed.
569 (1924); and Moore v. Lewisburg & R. Elec. Ry., 80 W. Va. 653, 93 S. E.
762, L. R. A. 1918A 1028 (1917), noted in (1918) 3 CoRN. L. Q. 311-313 and
(1917) 3 VA. L. REa. (i. s.) 623. As to inns, in 1623 the King's Bench held
that if an innkeeper "taketh down his signe, and giveth over the keeping of
an inn, then he is discharged from giving lodging." GODBOLT 335, p1. 440.
Cf. Note (1923) 32 YsE L. J. 75.
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Supreme Court's ruling: export agreements for the benefit of out,-
side consumers were expressly made subject to a usual priority in
favor of domestic users. That avenue of self-help has been effective-
ly closed by the terms of the 1938 Act; and gas will presumably
move in interstate commerce as the commission may decide and
under its terms.
What is the economy of the producing state that should be con-
sidered here? Briefly, it is the interest of that state in conserving
its natural resources-so far as Pennsylvania v. West Virginia will
permit-and in their orderly marketing so "that their true value
may be returned to the state's total resources" 'n as these wasting
assets are consumed. In Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols
Oil Co.," 2 the United States Supreme Court recently held:
"If these wells, most of them small, were restricted to
production on the basis of an hourly potential formula, it might
be unprofitable to operate them at all. Not only are the indi-
vidual interests of these small operators involved, but their
effect upon the state's economy is an appropriate factor to be
taken into account when plans are devised to keep the wells
open."
If the producing state's interest be borne in mind, a fair value
must be assigned to the operator's profit a prendre and to the
underlying gas reserves, that will bring prices sufficient to keel)
the wells open. Otherwise, reduced valuations will have the un-
toward effect of making marginal wells less profitable, and perhaps
of bringing about surrender of operated leaseholds even before cus-
tomary abandonment pressures are reached. Once such a well has
been given up and the casing pulled, the remaining gas is probably
lost forever. To put the proposition another way-unreasonably
low valuing of gas rights will almost certainly conflict, with modern
statutory ideals of conservation in effect elsewhere," 3 since the
overhead of small wells cannot survive rate-base reduction. And
wholly apart from the unnecessary waste that may follow any
policy of writing off the true worth of the operator's incorporeal
right and appraising it only at book cost, the state may properly
urge that its irreplaceable assets should not be deliberately under-
lThe writer is in agreement with the views advanced in the Brief on be-
half of the State of West Virginia, filed with the Federal Power Commission
a few months ago, by the Governor and the Attorney General of West Virginia.
See PRicE, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL FUELS IN WEST VIRGINIA (1940).
112 310 U. S. 573, 582, 00 S. Ct. 1021, 84 L. Ed. 1368 (1940), per Frank-
furter, J.
113 Williams, supra n. 105.
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valued, particularly so as to build up and sustain industries else-
where. It is true that one state may not "keep its coal, the north-
west its timber, the mining states their minerals" as the Supreme
Court 114 put it; yet there is nothing in that dictum which would
enable the federal government to take away those resources without
reasonable compensation. The analogy is far closer here to the
law of eminent domain than to usual rate-making: after all, the
ordinary utility normally retains its capital assets during the period
of its regulation. Unless the respective legal estates of reversioner
and operator are carefully taken into account, the ownership of
each is divested at a fictitious price; and their state as guardian of
the public interest"' may legitimately protest. Finally, the state's
tax revenues are obviously endangered by a depreciated rate base,
since both property and production levies depend directly on the
value of the gas lease.:" If either the production is reduced by
abandoning wells or the proceeds of gas sales diminished by inter-
state rate-making, the fiscal position is seriously disturbed.
A word might be added, too, as regards the claim of the lessor,
whose reversionary interest in the gas might be lost altogether if
the small well were ultimately surrendered and plugged. Surely,
as owner in fee of the gas, he should be represented in some way
during the rate proceedings: it is his gas which is being severed
and then transported in interstate commerce. Where his compen-
sation is in the nature of a gas well rental for the producing awd
paying life of the field, that rent-receiving reversion ought to justi-
fy recognition in leasehold valuation. A fortiori, if the lessor has
stipulated for, an "eighth" gas royalty, the export price becomes a
matter of even more vital concern to him. It is difficult to infer
that the lease contemplated an eventual valuing of both profit a
prendre and reversion on the basis of the book cost, comprising the
original nominal consideration and the later development expense.
In that event, the lessor would no doubt be surprised to find that
he had no legal claim to any part of the discovery value.
1 7
14 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 599 (1923) per Van
Devanter, J., quoting from West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229,
255, 31 S. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716, 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1193 (1911).
1" f., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 142, 22 S. Ct. 552, 46 L. Ed. 838
(1902); 'ryoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 42 S. Ct. 552, 66 L. Ed. 999
(1922y; Iissouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241, 21 S. Ct. 331, 45 L. Ed. 497
(1901); and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 27 S. Ct. 618, 51
L. Ed. 1038 (1907). The state sues as parens patriae: Note (1924) 37 HARV.
L. REV. 893.
116 See W. VA. R. CODE (1931) e. 11, art. 6, §§11, 14 and 16; and e. 11,
art. 13, §§1, 2 and 2a.
117 As to opinion evidence regarding lease values, see Millan v. Bartlett, 78
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It is a truism recognized by most authorities that increasing
costs are inevitable in natural gas production,'"" yet unfortunately
there is no remedy in sight. Certainly book-cost leasehold valuation
is not the solution. If there is to be legislative rate-making, it should
be analogized rather to bituminous coal price-fixing, 119 with the
ideals of conservation and investment stability linked up to the con-
cept of consumer protection. Admirable in tone and matter as the
Natural Gas Act may be, the history of Appalachian gas fields
would have well repaid an attentive perusal by the draftsmen of
that statute.
Doubtless all these perplexing questions as to valuation of gas
profits a prendre and as to the implications of Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia will fairly be worked out in time by the Federal Power
Commission and the reviewing courts. Perhaps, in the light of the
two recent Supreme Court decisions, the present observations are
too near the canvas to see the picture; at the proper distance phases
that seem irrelevant and even harsh will probably fall together as
in a perfect symmetry. But Lord Mansfield "never liked law so
well as when it was like equity"1 2 0-and here, if ever, equitable
principles should control.
W. Va. 367, 89 S. E. 711 (1916), syl, 4. An eminent member of the \West Vir-
ginia bar, in arguing the issue of leasehold valuation before the United
States Supreme Court, commented on book cost in these terms: "There is
some testimony that leases have been taken at a certain figure,--that is, that
that is what has been paid to the landowner for getting leases. Nobody pro-
tends, nobody can pretend, that you could go out in West Virginia today and
assemble a similar block to this; and we are not compelled to assume for
purposes of valuing, that we surrender today the ownership we have enjoyed
since 1911, return the property to a pioneer condition and go out to consult
with the individual mountaineer, as those did who first got it together. And
even if they did that, the West Virginia mountaineer has learned something
in the course of the last twenty-five years."I
il8WYFa, LouIsANA's NATURAL GAS SITuATIoN 8: "The universal experi-
ence in all natural gas fields in North America has been that:
1-As the wells are drawn on the pressures go down and the volume
delivered decreases. The operating cost is not lowered and this de-
clining volume thus increases the cost per unit of output from the
wells.
2-As the well pressures go down gas compressors must be installed thus
obviously increasing the cost.
3-As the rock pressures still further decline, the capacity of installed
compressors is decreased, as shown in the preceding section.
4-New wells drilled in the field will average a lower delivering capacity
than original wells thus giving a higher investment per unit of output.
5-The cost of carrying reserve acreage for future drilling operations be-
cause of accumulated effect of the interest increases and makes well
drilling operations more expensive than those in the earlier period of
field development.
6-All conservation measures cost money and as more conservation
methods are used, as the field becomes older, this increases the cost of
the gas."
119 15 U. S. C. A. §§828-851.
120 Dursley v. Fitzhardinge Berkeley, 6 Ves. 251, 260 (1801), per Lord
Eldon, C.
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